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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
Hurrell-Harring v. State'
(decided May 6, 2010)
The twenty plaintiffs in this consolidated action were indigent
criminal defendants who were all assigned public defenders to
represent them.2 Plaintiffs claimed that New York State "deprive[d]
them and other similarly situated indigent defendants . .. of constitu-
tionally and statutorily guaranteed representational rights" 3 by leav-
ing them unrepresented or underrepresented during criminal proceed-
ings.4 They sought "a declaration that their rights and those of the
class they seek to represent are being violated and an injunction to
avert further abridgement of their right to counsel"5 under both the
United States Constitution 6 and the New York Constitution.' The
appellate division dismissed the complaint as non-justiciable, reject-
ing the allegations that New York's public defense system denied the
right to effective assistance of counsel. The New York Court of
Appeals, construing the allegations in the light most favorable to the
' 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010).
2 Id. at 219. The plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of other indigent criminal
defendants. Id. There were twenty plaintiffs from Washington, Onondaga, Ontario, Schuy-
ler, and Suffolk counties. Id. at 219, 222.
Id. at 219. The court noted that in New York, the counties are in charge of providing
counsel as required after Gideon, however, plaintiffs "contend[ed] that this arrangement"
deprived them of their rights." Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 219.
4 Id. at 222.
5 Id. at 219. Plaintiffs did not seek relief from the criminal cases that they were facing.
Id.
6 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence."
Article 1, section 6 of the New York Constitution reads, in pertinent part: "In any trial in
any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and
with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and the cause of the accu-
sation and be confronted with the witnesses against him or her."
8 Hurrell-Harring v. State (Hurrell 1), 883 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2009).
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plaintiffs,9 characterized the complaint as stating "a claim for con-
structive denial of the right to counsel by reason of insufficient com-
pliance with the constitutional mandate of Gideon."'0 In a four-to-
three decision, the court held that the plaintiffs stated a cognizable
claim for constructive denial of the right to counsel," and that ar-
raignment was a critical stage for purposes of the right to counsel,
even if a guilty plea was not elicited.12 The court sought to provide
fundamental protection for both the indigent's right to counsel, and
the availability of a remedy when counsel is denied, regardless of
guilt or innocence."
There were twenty plaintiffsl4 from five counties-
Washington, Onondaga, Ontario, Schuyler, and Suffolk. '5 The plain-
tiffs were "defendants in various criminal prosecutions ongoing at the
time of [the] action's commencement." 6 Ten of the plaintiffs were
completely without representation at arraignment, and eight of those
ten were jailed after they could not make bail." The plaintiffs al-
leged that such events were "illustrative of what is a fairly common
practice . . . of arraigning defendants without counsel and leaving
them, particularly when accused of relatively low level offenses, un-
represented in subsequent proceedings where pleas are taken and oth-
er critically important legal transactions take place."" One of the
9 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 224-25.
10 Id. at 225. The court made clear that the complaint did not claim ineffective assistance
of counsel. See id. at 224 ("These allegations state a claim not for ineffective assistance un-
der Strickland, but for basic denial of the right to counsel under Gideon."). In making this
determination, the court stated that [t]he basic . . . question ... is whether the State has met
its obligation to provide counsel, not whether . . . counsel's performance was inadequate or
prejudicial." Id. at 225.
" Id. at 222.
12 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 223. However, there is no general acceptance of this
conclusion. For example, many states do not provide counsel at the bail hearing. See, e.g.,
Rothgery v. Gillespe Cnty., 554 U.S. 191 (2008). In Rothgery, the defendant was not pro-
vided counsel at the article 15.7 hearing, which combined the probable cause determination
with the bail hearing. See id. at 195-96. But see McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 173
(1991) (stating that Wisconsin provided counsel at the bail hearing).
" Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 227 ("Gideon 's guarantee to the assistance of counsel
does not turn upon a defendant's guilt or innocence, and neither can the availability of a re-
medy for its denial.").
14 Id. at 222.
" Id. at 219.
16 Id.
Id. at 222.
Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 222.
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plaintiffs was without counsel for five months.' 9
Plaintiffs also alleged what the court referred to as "nominal"
representation, 20 meaning that the appointed attorneys were unavaila-
ble, that they conferred with their clients "little, if at all," and were
"often completely unresponsive to [their client's] urgent requests
from jail, sometimes for months on end." 2' Appointed counsel
waived important rights without consultation, missed court appear-
ances, were unprepared or unqualified, 22 and were "seriously con-
flicted" in the case.23
The Albany County Supreme Court denied the State's motion
to dismiss the action as non-justiciable.24 On appeal, the appellate
division granted the defendants' motion,25 viewed the complaint as
containing only claims for ineffective assistance,26 and held that there
was "no cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel other
than one seeking postconviction relief."27  Furthermore, the court
held that a violation of a criminal defendant's right to counsel could
not be brought in a collateral civil proceeding, especially where the
object of the proceeding was to "compel an additional allocation of
public resources, which the court found to be a properly legislative
prerogative."28
1 Id. See Hurrell I, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 357 (Peters, J., dissenting). One plaintiff, James
Adams, was charged with robbery in the third degree and burglary in the third degree after
stealing several sticks of deodorant from a drug store. Id. He was unrepresented at arraign-
ment and unable to meet bail. Id. Adams's attorney repeatedly failed to appear in court and
declined to return phone calls. Id. The court ultimately reviewed the charges on its own in-
itiative, and found that Adams had been overcharged. Id. Adams lost his job as a result of
the incarceration, and his wife, two daughters, and granddaughter were evicted from their
home. HurrellI, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
20 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 222 ("In addition to the foregoing allegations of out-
right nonrepresentation, the complaint contains allegations to the effect that although lawyers
were eventually nominally appointed for plaintiffs, they were unavailable to their
clients. . .
21 id
22 Id Counsel did not appear to be prepared, "often because they were entirely new to the
case, the matters having previously been handled by other similarly unprepared counsel." Id.
23 id
24 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 219-20.
25 id.
26 Id. at 220.
27 Id. (stating that a "violation of a criminal defendant's right to counsel" could not be





Koster: Court of Appeals of New York: Hurrell-Harring v. State
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2011
TOURO LAWREVIEW
The New York Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the indigent
plaintiffs. 29 The court, construing the facts in a light most favorable
to the plaintiffs,30 held that the plaintiffs stated cognizable Sixth
Amendment claims,3 that arraignment was a critical stage of a crim-
inal proceeding, "even if guilty pleas were not then elicited," 32 and
ruled that indigent criminal defendants could vindicate their rights to
the effective assistance of counsel outside the post-conviction con-
text.33 Considering the allegations, the court expressed concern that
indigent criminal defendants were regularly being denied counsel.34
"The picture which emerges from a fair and procedurally appropriate
reading of the complaint is that defendants are with some regularity
going unrepresented at arraignment and subsequent critical stages."35
The court viewed the plaintiffs' complaint as seeking assurance of the
constitutional guarantee of representation at all critical stages of a
criminal proceeding.36 Recognizing that such protection existed, the
court allowed the case to proceed by establishing arraignment as a
critical stage.37
The court began its opinion by referencing the holding in
Gideon, that indigent criminal defendants have the right to assistance
of counsel. That right attaches during critical stages of the criminal
proceeding. 39 In New York, the Legislature has made it the respon-
29 See Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 227-28.
30 Id at 224-25.
31 Id. at 222.
32 Id. at 223.
33 Id. at 227 ("Gideon's guarantee to the assistance of counsel does not turn upon a defen-
dant's guilt or innocence, and neither can the availability of a remedy for its denial.").
34 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 227.
3 Id. at 225. See id. at 227 ("[T]here is considerable risk that indigent defendants are,
with a fair degree of regularity, being denied constitutionally mandated counsel" (emphasis
added)). Of course, nominal representation does not fulfill the constitutional requirement as
"[t]he Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal
appointment." Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940).
36 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 224.
7 Id. ("In New York, arraignment is, as a general matter, such a [critical] stage."). The
court listed other critical stages, including "the period between arraignment and trial when a
case must be factually developed and researched, decisions respecting grand jury testimony
made, plea negotiations conducted, and pre-trial motions filed." Id. " '[A] bail hearing is a
critical stage of the State's criminal process' " as well. Id at 223 (quoting Higazy v. FBI
Agent Michael Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2007)).
38 See id at 219; see also Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
3 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) ("[O]ur cases have construed the
Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to 'critical' stages of the proceedings.").
[Vol. 27712
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sibility of the individual counties to fulfill Gideon 's mandate. 40 The
plaintiffs sought a declaration that this arrangement violated their
right to the effective assistance of counsel 4' because the counties of-
ten left the indigent defendants unrepresented.4 2 Indigent defendants
in New York State regularly suffered violations of their established
constitutional rights due to "inadequate funding and staffing of indi-
gent defense providers."4 3 The State argued that an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim was not capable of addressing systemic defi-
ciencies" because "effective assistance is a judicial construct
designed to do no more than protect an individual defendant's right to
a fair adjudication; it is not a concept capable of expansive applica-
tion to remediate systemic deficiencies."4 5
The court recognized that this argument was rooted in case
law such as Strickland v. Washington46 and its New York counter-
part, People v. Benevento.47 Indeed, it even agreed that "a fair read-
ing" of relevant case law supported the State's position that the effec-
tive assistance of counsel was "designed to do no more than protect
an individual defendant's right to a fair adjudication," 48 and was not
capable of curing systemic deficiencies.49 Such cases were "notable
for their intentional omission of any broadly applicable defining per-
formance standards."so
Rather than affirm the appellate division's dismissal, the court
determined that the plaintiffs' complaint had strayed too far from the
fundamentals of Gideon. It observed that an ineffective assistance
claim presupposed that the obligation to provide counsel for indigent
criminal defendants under Gideon was actually being met by the
states.5 1 The court determined that New York's approach of delegat-
40 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 219.
41 Hurrelll, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
42 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 222.
43 Id. at 224.
4 Id. at 220.
45 Id. at 221.
46 466 U.S. 688 (1984).
47 697 N.E.2d 584 (N.Y. 1998).
48 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 221.
49' id.
50 Id
51 Id. ("Strickland's approach is expressly premised on the supposition that the fundamen-
tal underlying right to representation under Gideon has been enabled by the State in a man-
ner that would justify the presumption that the standard of objective reasonableness will or-
2011] 713
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ing responsibility to the counties failed to fulfill Gideon's mandate,
and therefore it re-framed the issue by asking "whether the State has
met its foundational obligation under Gideon to provide legal repre-
sentation." 52
The court reframed the issue in order to remedy the "broad
systemic deficiencies" it saw in the allegations.53 It recognized the
inability of the ineffective assistance theory to remedy systemic defi-
ciencies, 54 but was able to proceed in part due to the appellate divi-
sion's dismissal of the complaint. Considering the procedural posture
of the State's motion to dismiss, the court was required to construe
the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. 5 In doing so, it
found that the complaint stated a claim "for constructive denial of the
right to counsel by reason of insufficient compliance with the consti-
tutional mandate of Gideon."56
The "constructive denial" language is derived from United
States Supreme Court case law.5 7 "Actual or constructive denial of
the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in
prejudice."58 In these situations, prejudice is so likely that a case-by-
case inquiry is not necessary because it is not worth the cost.59 This
may occur when counsel is denied at trial, or when counsel "fails to
subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." 60
Recognizing the existence of "broad systemic deficiencies" where in-
digent defendants regularly went "unrepresented at arraignment and
subsequent critical stages,,61 the court concluded that the facts al-
leged stated a claim falling within these categories.62 Therefore, the
plaintiffs did in fact state a cognizable claim under the Sixth
Amendment, even though it was in the form of a collateral pre-
dinarily be satisfied.").
52 Id. at 222-23.
" Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 225.
54 Id at 221 (noting that ineffective assistance "is not a concept capable of expansive ap-
plication to remediate systemic deficiencies").
* Id at 224-25.
6 Id. at 225.
s Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
58 Id
SId.
6 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984).
6! Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 225.








The right to counsel and, consequently, the aforementioned
prejudice rule, attach at critical stages of the criminal proceeding. 4
As a result, the court needed to connect Gideon to Cronic's rules re-
garding actual and constructive denial of counsel. It did this by hold-
ing that arraignment is a critical stage, even if a guilty plea was not
elicited.65 By establishing arraignment as a critical stage, the court
could hold that the right to counsel was violated, presume prejudice
under Cronic and thereby avoid a case-by-case inquiry, allow the col-
lateral claim to proceed, and ultimately provide a remedy for the sys-
temic deficiencies it saw in the plaintiffs' complaint. Despite the
court's holding, it is still unclear how this decision will affect the
lives of indigent criminal defendants. It allowed discovery to pro-
ceed, and remanded to the appellate division.66 The case could return
to the Court of Appeals at a later date, at which time important issues
in this case could be further developed and the real world implica-
tions of this decision will be fully realized.
Judge Pigott, joined by Judges Read and Smith, dissented and
provided four main arguments against the majority's position.
First, the issues raised were properly addressed to the Legislature.68
Second, the majority mischaracterized the plaintiffs' claims as "con-
structive denial," because the complaint simply presented ineffective
assistance claims. 69  Third, arraignment was not a critical stage.70
Finally, the plaintiffs failed to allege a cause of action for the "depri-
vation of the right to counsel at arraignment."7 '
Judge Pigott believed that the plaintiffs' grievances should be
addressed to the Legislature, which it saw as "the proper forum for
weighing proposals to enhance indigent defense services in New
6 Id. at 222.
' Wade, 388 U.S. at 226-27.
65 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 223. The court included the language "even if a guilty
plea was not then elicited" to address case law holding that there was no Sixth Amendment
violation where the defendant was arraigned without counsel and plead not guilty. See Unit-
ed States ex rel. Combs v. Denno, 357 F.2d 809, 812 (2d Cir. 1966); Hurrell-Harring, 930
N.E.2d at 231 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
66 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 228.
6 See id. at 228-32 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 232.
69 Id at 229.
0 Id. at 230.
n Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 231.
2011] 715
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York." 72 Although the dissent did not focus on this argument, it was
reminiscent of the appellate division's decision to find the claim non-
justiciable on the same grounds. Judge Pigott also characterized the
majority's "constructive denial" cause of action as "nothing more
than an ineffective assistance claim under another name, 74 reiterat-
ing that ineffective assistance claims under Strickland and Benevento
are limited to the individual, and "cannot be used to attack alleged
systemic failures." 75 The dissent then turned to Cronic and argued
that the prejudice holding76 may only be applied after the criminal
proceeding has ended:
Constructive denial of counsel is a branch from the
Strickland tree, with Cronic applying only when the
appointed attorney's representation is so egregious
that it's as if [the] defendant had no attorney at all.
Therefore, whether a defendant received ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland or is entitled to
a presumption of prejudice under Cronic is a determi-
nation that can only be made after the criminal pro-
ceeding has ended; neither approach lends itself to a
proceeding like the one at bar where plaintiffs allege
prospective violations of their Sixth Amendment
rights.77
The dissent next disagreed with the establishment of arraign-
ment as a critical stage in New York because it felt that the "majori-
ty's bare conclusion that any arraignment conducted without the
presence of counsel renders the proceedings a violation of the Sixth
Amendment flies in the face of reality."7 8 Section 180.10(3) states
that "[t]he defendant has a right to the aid of counsel at the arraign-
ment and at every subsequent stage of the action." 79 It also required
the court to provide the criminal defendant with a copy of the
72 Id. at 232.
7 HurrellI, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
74 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 228.
SId.
76 See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-59.
7 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 229.
7 Id. at 230.
7 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.10(3) (McKinney 2010).
[Vol. 27716
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charges, and inform the defendant of his rights, including the right to
counsel.o Judge Piggot did not interpret this statute as supporting
the position that non-representation at arraignment is a violation of
the Sixth Amendment because he believed that the statute presuppos-
es that the defendant "may not have yet retained counsel or, due to
indigency, requires the appointment of one."8' In other words, he be-
lieved there may be situations where the absence of counsel at ar-
raignment may not be a violation of the Sixth Amendment, and inter-
preted the statute as supporting his position because it presupposes
that the defendant has yet to retain counsel.
Finally, Judge Pigott believed that the plaintiffs failed to
"state a cause of action for the deprivation of the right to counsel at
arraignment"8 because they did not allege that the failure to have
counsel at the first court appearance had an adverse effect on the pro-
ceedings." Without such a claim, prejudice could not be pre-
sumed-"the absence of counsel upon arraignment is [not] an inflex-
ible, per se violation of the Sixth Amendment."84 The dissent also
observed that the plaintiffs saw their attorneys shortly after arraign-
ment, further supporting its position that there was no prejudice, pre-
sumed or otherwise.8 1 Judge Piggot strongly disagreed with the ma-
jority on all major points, and accordingly would have affirmed the
decision of the appellate division.
The United States Supreme Court has, since its decision in
Gideon, protected the right of an accused in all criminal prosecutions
to "have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 86 In Gideon, the
Supreme Court held that " 'the right to the aid of counsel is of ...
fundamental character,' ,7 and applied the right to counsel to the
states, like other fundamental Bill of Rights provisions.88 Most im-
portantly, Gideon established that indigent criminal defendants were
8 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 230-31.
8 Id. at 230.
82 Id at 231.
8 Id
8 Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Caccio v. Fay, 350 F.2d 214, 215 (2d Cir. 1965)).
85 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 231.
86 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
87 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-43 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932)). See
also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
243-44 (1936).
88 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342 (holding that Sixth Amendment rights were fundamental in
nature and therefore "obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment").
2011] 717
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entitled to counsel in criminal proceedings" because "any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." 90 The criminal defen-
dant "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the pro-
ceedings against him," because "[w]ithout it, though he be not guilty,
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence." 9' Subsequent decisions established that the
right to counsel attached at critical stages of the criminal proceeding
because "depriv[ing] a person of counsel during the period prior to
trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial it-
self."92
The right of effective assistance was mandated in Powell v.
Alabama, where the Supreme Court extended Sixth Amendment
rights to include effective aid. 93 Indeed, "[i]t has long been recog-
nized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel."9 4 Today, the issue is governed by Strickland.95 In Strick-
land, the Supreme Court set a two-part standard for an ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim. 96 The Court held that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel was needed in order to protect the fundamental
right to a fair trial, 97 which is "one in which evidence subject to ad-
versarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of
issues defined in advance of the proceeding." 98 The aid of counsel is
' Id. at 344.
[L]awyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of
one charged with [a] crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. . . . This
noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with [a] crime has
to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
Id.
9 Id.
" Id. at 345.
92 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985). See also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300, 310-11 (1973) (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 224).
9 See Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 586 (citing Powell in holding that the Sixth Amendment
mandate extends to providing effective aid); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344
(1980) (stating that the Constitution guarantees an accused "adequate legal assistance").
94 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
96 Id. at 687.
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critical to the adversarial system's production of a fair trial, 99 and
therefore, "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance
of counsel." 00
The Supreme Court held that an ineffective assistance analy-
sis consisted of two parts: (1) an examination to determine whether
counsel's performance was deficient, meaning that "counsel made er-
rors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment," 10' and (2) there
was a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 02
Furthermore, an affirmative showing of prejudice must be made. 103
There is no "check list," only guides to determine whether effective
assistance was rendered.104
United States v. Cronic'os was decided on the same day as
Strickland. In Cronic, the Supreme Court presented an exception to
Strickland's "requirement that a defendant asserting an ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim demonstrate a deficient performance and
prejudice." 06  Under Cronic, a court may bypass that analysis:
(1) where counsel was completely denied or was denied at a critical
stage in the proceeding, (2) where counsel "entirely fail[ed] to subject
the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing," or (3)
where the "likelihood that any lawyer . .. could provide effective as-
sistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate
without inquiry into the actual conduct of trial." 0 7
The Court provided examples of actual or constructive denial
of counsel. "Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of coun-
sel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice." 08  Where
prejudice is presumed, there is no need to examine the claim on a
9 Id ("The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it
envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to
produce just results.").
" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (citing McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14).
101 Id. at 687.
102 Id. at 694. See also Rosario v. Ercole, 601 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2010); People v.
Turner, 840 N.E.2d 123, 125 (N.Y. 2005).
'03 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
104 Id. at 688.
"0s 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
106 See Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 229 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
107 Id. (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60).
10 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
2011] 719
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case-by-case basis because prejudice is so likely that such an inquiry
is not worth the cost.'" Therefore, Cronic's holding provided the
court in Hurrell-Harring with the means to presume prejudice when
there was constructive denial of counsel, thereby avoiding the need to
engage in a case-by-case inquiry of the claims.
The source of the indigent criminal defendant's right to coun-
sel is Gideon, where the Supreme Court held that indigent criminal
defendants are entitled to counsel in criminal proceedings. "o After
Gideon, the Court considered a line of cases concerning when and
under what circumstances the right to counsel attached. The Court
held that the right attaches when the prosecution commences,"'
which has been described as attaching at the initial appearance before
a judicial officer," 2 or simply at the first formal proceeding."' Put
simply, commencement is "pegged" to the "initiation of adversary
judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment,"ll 4 be-
cause this is when "the government has committed itself to prosecute
. . . . [and] a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial
forces of organized society.""'
The right to counsel applies during "critical" stages of the
criminal proceedings.l16 The Court applies the "critical" rule in rec-
ognition of the difference between the realities of modern criminal
prosecution and the state of prosecution at the time the Bill of Rights
was written."' 7 In United States v. Ash, the Court explained the test
109 Id.
"0 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
... McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175.
112 See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 200 (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399
(1977)).
" See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 180-81.
114 Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 198 (quoting United States v. Goiveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188
(1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1s Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion).
116 Ash, 413 U.S. at 310-11; Wade, 388 U.S. at 244.
" Wade, 388 U.S. at 224.
When the Bill of Rights was adopted, there were no organized police
forces as we know them today. The accused confronted the prosecutor
and the witnesses against him, and the evidence was marshalled, largely
at the trial itself. In contrast, today's law enforcement machinery in-
volves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretri-
al proceedings where the results might well settle the accused's fate and
reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these reali-
720 [Vol. 27
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for determining whether the stage was critical: If defects of the con-
frontation cannot be cured at trial, then the stage was critical."' In
analyzing United States v. Wade, the Court in Ash saw "that there
were times when the subsequent trial would cure a one-sided con-
frontation between prosecuting authorities and the uncounseled de-
fendant. In other words, such stages were not 'critical.' "l9 The Su-
preme Court has considered a number of confrontational stages and
indicated that interrogation 20 and preliminary plea hearingsl2' could
be critical.
Second Circuit case law also provides guidance on this issue.
For example, the Second Circuit in Higazy held that a bail hearing
was a critical stage of the proceeding.122  In citing to a number of
federal cases to establish the attachment of the right to counsel at crit-
ical stages, the court in Hurrell-Harring recognized that "a bail hear-
ing is a critical stage of the State's criminal process." 23  This lan-
guage comes from the Supreme Court.124  Second Circuit case law
was also used to support the dissent's position. The dissent argued
that the court could not find a Sixth Amendment violation where the
plaintiffs failed to allege an adverse effect on the proceedings,12 5 be-
cause the "Second Circuit has rejected the assertion 'that the absence
of counsel upon arraignment is an inflexible, per se violation of the
ties of modem criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth
Amendment guarantee to apply to 'critical' stages of the proceedings.
Id.
"' Ash, 413 U.S. at 316 ("[T]he opportunity to cure defects at trial causes the confronta-
tion to cease to be critical.").
"' Id. at 315.
120 See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 204-05 (1964).
121 See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59,
60 (1963). The Court in Rothgery also indicated that arraignment could be a critical stage.
There, the Court considered Texas's article 15.7 hearing and noted that the Court "had twice
held that the right to counsel attaches at the initial appearance before a judicial officer."
Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 199. The Court did not hold that arraignment is a critical stage. Ra-
ther, it held that "a criminal defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he
learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adver-
sary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."
Id at 213.
122 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 223 (citing Higazy, 505 F.3d at 172).
123 Id. (quoting Higazy, 505 F.3d at 172).
124 Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9-10.
125 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 231 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
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Sixth Amendment.' ,126 Similarly, another Second Circuit case held
that there is no Sixth Amendment violation when the criminal defen-
dant is arraigned without counsel and pleads not guilty. 127  This
precedent was used to argue against the majority opinion.128
Hurrell-Harring presents two important issues: the indigent
defendant's right to counsel, and the right of effective assistance of
counsel. New York naturally follows the constitutional mandates of
Gideon and its progeny, but the state also has its own case law con-
cerning the right to counsel. 129 The New York Court of Appeals held
that the right to counsel applied to pre-trial proceedings and the tri-
al.130 It is significant that the court recognized the importance of hav-
ing access to counsel during the pre-trial proceedings, because with-
out it defendants may lose their liberty before the trial even begins.
"The right to use counsel at the formal trial is a very hollow thing
when, for all practical purposes, the conviction is already assured by
pre-trial examination."' 3 1  New York also requires the presence of
counsel at critical stages. 132
Under Supreme Court case law, the right to counsel includes
the right to the effective assistance of counsel.133  "The State and
Federal constitutional right to counsel, so fundamental to our form of
justice, is the right to effective assistance of counsel, meaning the
reasonably competent services of an attorney devoted to the client's
best interests." 34  In Benevento, the New York Court of Appeals
noted that the existence of the right to effective assistance of counsel
reflects the fact that "our legal system is concerned as much with the
integrity of the judicial process as with the issue of guilt or inno-
126 Id. (quoting Caccio, 350 F.2d at 215).
127 See Combs, 357 F.2d 809.
128 See Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 231 (Pigott, J., dissenting) (citing Combs, 357 F.2d
at 812).
129 See Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584.
130 Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d at 152.
131 Id. (quoting In re Groben, 352 U.S. 330, 344 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
132 See Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 223 (holding that the right to counsel attaches at
arraignment and "entails the presence of counsel at each subsequent 'critical' stage of the
proceedings" (quoting Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085)).
' People v. Bennett, 280 N.E.2d 637, 639 (1972) ("[T]he right . .. to be represented by
an attorney means more than just having a person with a law degree nominally represent [the
defendant] upon trial and ask questions."). See also Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 586.
134 People v. Ortiz, 564 N.E.2d 630, 632 (N.Y. 1990).
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cence."l 35 It also presented the standard for analyzing ineffective as-
sistance of counsel in New York,136 which may be described as
"meaningful representation." 37  The defendant must show that the
attorney's performance "fell below the objective standard of reasona-
bleness."' 3 8 Prejudice to the defendant is not explicitly required, but
rather is included in the meaningful representation standard.139 The
analysis uses a flexible case-by-case inquiry 40 rather than "specific,
generally applicable performance standards."' 4 ' The federal and
New York approaches to ineffective assistance share some similari-
ties. Both reject rigid guidelines in favor of a more flexible analy-
sis.14 2  Although the New York Court of Appeals has declined to
adopt Strickland,143 the approaches are consistent with one another in
that both require a showing that the attorney's performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.'" The Strickland approach
takes the analysis one step further by requiring the defendant to show
that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been differ-
ent." 45
The court's decision in Hurrell-Harring represents an impor-
tant step for indigent criminal defendants. Recognizing years of in-
adequate representation in the criminal justice system, the court
looked to the most fundamental representational rights under Gide-
1 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588 (quoting People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 154
(1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136 See also Rosario, 601 F.3d at 123-24; People v. Turner, 840 N.E.2d 123, 125-26 (N.Y.
2005).
137 See Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 587-88 ("The core of the inquiry is whether [the] defen-
dant received 'meaningful representation. "... . The question is whether the attorney's
conduct constituted 'egregious and prejudicial' error such that defendant did not receive a
fair trial" (quoting People v. Flores, 639 N.E.2d 19, 21 (N.Y. 1994) (internal quotation
marks omitted))); see also People v. Baldi, 429 N.E.2d 400, 404 (N.Y. 1981) (stating that the
right "varies according to the unique circumstances of each representation").
131 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
139 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588 ("Under the State Constitution, 'prejudice' is examined
more generally in the context of whether defendant received meaningful representation.").
140 Id. at 587.
141 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 221.
142 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89; Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 221.
143 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 589.
14 Rosario, 601 F.3d at 123-24; Turner, 840 N.E.2d at 125-26.
145 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
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on.14 6 In doing so, it bypassed Strickland's requirement that the de-
fendant suffer prejudice, yet still took advantage of the rule that pre-
judice is presumed when there has been a constructive denial of
counsel.
Much has been made of Strickland's failure to provide ade-
quate protection for indigent criminal defendants.14 7  In Hurrell-
Harring, the New York Court of Appeals indirectly addressed that
issue. Indeed, it seems as if the majority wanted to find for the plain-
tiffs in spite of Supreme Court case law-it saw deficiencies in the
system, and recognized that Strickland was not capable of addressing
systemic ineffective assistance claims. The result was a dramatic re-
reading of the plaintiffs' complaint by the court. In holding that the
plaintiffs' stated a claim for constructive denial of counsel, the court
indicated that the plaintiffs had incorrectly relied on Strickland, and
refrained the issue based on constructive denial under Gideon. By re-
reading the plaintiffs' complaint, the court rendered a decision in fa-
vor of the indigent criminal defendants.
The difference between the majority and the dissent lies in the
desire to protect the constitutional rights of the indigent defendants.
The majority wanted to find a way to address the facts alleged in the
complaint. As a result, it was willing to look past strict construction
of statutes and case law in order to find for the plaintiffs. For exam-
ple, the majority dealt with Strickland's inability to address systemic
deficiencies by looking to Cronic and presuming prejudice. It by-
passed persuasive precedent by holding that arraignment was critical
even when a guilty plea was not elicited. It was unable to force the
legislature to pay for indigent services, so it provided a judicial reme-
dy for indigent criminal defendants.
This important decision could be an indication of what is to
come in other jurisdictions. There are currently two approaches to
addressing this issue. The first, like Hurrell-Harring, uses litigation
as the means for bringing about reform. The second goes directly
through the legislature for statutory changes. Both are worth consi-
dering.
1" See Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 222-23.
147 See Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58
MD. L. REv. 1433, 1446 (1999) (observing that "the Strickland Court interpreted the re-
quirements of the Sixth Amendment's right to effective assistance of counsel in such an ul-
timately meaningless manner as to require little more than a warm body with a law degree
standing next to the defendant").
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In Duncan v. Michigan,14 8 like Hurrell-Harring, the lawsuit
was a class action brought by indigent criminal defendants.149  The
complaint alleged that the indigent defendants, "as well as future in-
digent defendants subject to felony prosecutions, are being denied
state and federal constitutional rights to counsel and the effective as-
sistance of counsel."15 0 After the circuit judge granted class certifica-
tion and denied the state's motion for summary judgment, the Court
of Appeals of Michigan affirmed.' 5 ' The Supreme Court of Michi-
gan initially issued an order affirming the decision of the Court of
Appeals,152 but in July 2010 the court vacated that decision.153  The
court stated that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment
because the plaintiffs' claims were non-justiciable.154 In yet another
stunning about-face, the court in November 2010 vacated the July or-
der and reinstated the original decision because reconsideration had
been "improperly granted."' 5  In December 2010, the court denied a
request to reconsider the November opinion.156  This granted class
148 (Duncan II), 784 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 2010).
149 Id. at 53.
so Id
151 Duncan v. Michigan (Duncan 1), 774 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
We cannot accept the proposition that the constitutional rights of our cit-
izens, even those accused of crimes and too poor to afford counsel, are
not deserving and worthy of any protection by the judiciary in a situation
where the executive and legislative branches fail to comply with consti-
tutional mandates and abdicate their constitutional responsibilities, either
intentionally or neglectfully.
Id.
152 See Duncan II, 784 N.W.2d at 53.
153 Id. at 51 (majority order) (vacating the order dated April 30, 2010). The weak econo-
my probably played a role in this stunning reversal of a decision that had been handed down
just three months earlier. The concurrence states that allowing the litigation to proceed
would issue "an open invitation to the trial court to assume ongoing operational control over
the systems for providing defense counsel to indigent criminal defendants . .. And with that
invitation comes a 'blank check' on the part of the judiciary to 'force sufficient state level
legislative appropriations and executive branch acquiescence.' " Id. at 53.
154 Id. The court took the position of the Court of Appeals dissent from Duncan I, which
argued that the "plaintiffs lacked standing, that their claims were neither ripe nor justiciable,
and that the class had been erroneously certified."
155 Duncan v. State, 790 N.W.2d 695 (Mich. 2010).
156 Duncan v. State, 791 N.W.2d 713, 713 (Mich. 2010). Political motives and changing
government likely lie at the heart of these events. In the December order, Justice Corrigan
stated that the majority wanted to act "before the end of the calendar year with clear intent
to prevent the newly constituted Court after January, 2011, from considering defendants'
motion." Id. at 713 (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
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certification and allowed the case to proceed to trial. 1 7 Duncan illu-
strates the unpredictability that comes with protecting constitutional
rights through litigation, and suggests that seeking reform through the
legislature might be a more stable, if not less likely, means of achiev-
ing constitutional protection.
Montana,15 8 Georgia,'59 and Texas160 all have statewide pub-
lic defense systems. Although none of these systems are perfect, they
illustrate a different approach from that in New York. In Montana,
for example, the public defense system is governed by the Public De-
fender Act. 161 This system came about in response to a lawsuit
brought by the American Civil Liberties Union of Montana on behalf
of indigent criminal defendants. The case was never adjudicated be-
cause the plaintiffs stipulated that the suit would be postponed in or-
der to seek a legislative solution.162 The subsequent result was the
Public Defender Act, which describes standards for the provision of
counsel to indigent defendants, eligibility for state-funded counsel,163
and creates an office of the state public defender.'"
In Simmons v. State Public Defender,'65 the Supreme Court of
Iowa struck down a law limiting attorney's fees for state-appointed
defense attorneys.' 66 The statute required the state public defender to
establish fee caps for certain categories of cases.167 In striking down
this law, the court recognized the indigent criminal defendant's right
to effective assistance of counsel.168 The court stated that fee cap
legislation had a "chilling effect" on the constitutional rights of indi-
gent criminal defendants and conflicted with the "legislature's intent
to provide indigent defendants with effective assistance of coun-
sel."l 69 Although the practical effects of this case are not yet certain,
11 Id at 718.
158 Public Defender Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 47-1-111 (2009).
15 See Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 2003, GA. CODE ANN., § 17-12-1 (West 2010).
160 See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 1.051 (West 2010).
161 Public Defender Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 47-1-111 (2009).
162 Jessa DeSimone, Bucking Conventional Wisdom: The Montana Public Defender Act,
96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1479, 1499 (Summer 2006).
163 Public Defender Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 47-1-111.
1 Public Defender Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 47-1-201 (2009).
165 791 N.W.2d 69, 70 (Iowa 2010).
'6 Id. at 70.
167 Id at 71.
168 Id at 75.
'69 Id at 89.
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it is clear that the state of Iowa will be required to put more money
into the state public defender. This could attract more attorneys to
public defense, which could improve individual representation by
lightening the caseload of each attorney. Greater financial incentive
might also attract a higher caliber of attorney to public defense. As a
result, Simmons is a step towards an improved public defense system
in Iowa.
By analyzing the events in Michigan and the steps taken in
Montana and Iowa, it is clear that the New York Court of Appeals
has put New York at the forefront of this important constitutional is-
sue. Through Hurrell-Harring, the court declared that indigent crim-
inal defendants in New York would enjoy the full protection of their
constitutional rights. It bypassed the legislature and took it upon the
judiciary to protect the indigent criminal defendants. As a result,
Hurrell-Harring provides a model for courts in other jurisdictions
that wish to follow in the footsteps of New York.
Despite its promising holding, Hurrell-Harring might also
present practical problems in the future. For example, this ruling
could inundate the courts with indigent defendants' claims of con-
structive denial of counsel. Such claims might further overwhelm an
already over-worked public defender system.'o Private defense at-
torneys are unlikely to become involved in these cases on a long-
term, sustained basis because they are unlikely to produce legal fees.
Finally, the possibility of indigent defendants bringing constructive
denial claims outside the post-conviction context could slow the
progress of a given case, resulting in an even more crowded docket.
This is a controversial decision that is unlikely to receive
praise in society. The New York Court of Appeals recognized that
mandates protecting the rights of criminal defendants are often unpo-
pular, especially when they require public funds.1"' Nonetheless,
such protections are required under both the United States and New
York Constitutions, and are fundamental aspects of the judicial sys-
tem. It is imperative that the judiciary has a strong adversarial sys-
tem designed to protect the rights of all parties, especially when an
170 See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffec-
tive Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 679, 682-83 (2007) (describing pub-
lic defenders as "catastrophically overworked").
171 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 219 (recognizing that Gideon's mandate is "largely
unfunded and politically unpopular").
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individual's liberty may be at stake. Hurrell-Harring strengthens that
system, and protects the rights of indigent criminal defendants by
upholding established Sixth Amendment rights.
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